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ABSTRACT
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, which defines the scope of constitutional protection
from governmental privacy intrusions in both the United States and Canada, is notoriously
indeterminate. This indeterminacy stems in large measure from the tendency of judges to think
of privacy in non-instrumentalist terms. This “moral” approach to privacy is normatively
questionable, and it does a poor job of identifying the circumstances in which privacy should
prevail over countervailing interests, such as the deterrence of crime.
In this paper, I develop an alternative, economically-informed approach to the reasonable
expectation of privacy test. In contrast to the moral approach, which treats privacy as a
fundamental right, the economic approach views it as a (normatively neutral) aspect of selfinterest: the desire to conceal and control potentially damaging personal information. On this
view, privacy should not be protected when its primary effect is to impede the optimal deterrence
of crime. Legal protections against governmental surveillance, however, may in other cases
enhance social welfare by encouraging productive transactions, diminishing the costs of nonlegal privacy barriers, and limiting suboptimal policing practices, including discriminatory
profiling and the enforcement of inefficient criminal prohibitions. Economics and public choice
theory can also help to minimize decision-making error by predicting which legal actors – police,
legislatures, or courts – are best placed to make optimal trade-offs between privacy and crime
control.
I first describe the United States and Canadian supreme courts’ reasonable expectation of privacy
jurisprudence and canvass its chief inadequacy: the vagueness of the “public exposure” and
“intimacy” doctrines that the courts have used to decide whether to regulate novel search
technologies. I then outline the economic approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Next, I apply this approach to two technologically advanced search tools: infrared imaging and
location tracking. This analysis suggests that courts should recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the latter case, but not the former.

I

INTRODUCTION
In both the United States and Canada, the reasonable expectation of privacy test defines

the scope of constitutional protection from governmental privacy intrusions. When a court
decides that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to an investigative
technique, there is no “search” or “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution1 or section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 In
such cases, police are free (absent any statutory restriction) to use the technique without first
obtaining a warrant or establishing individualized suspicion.3 When there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy, in contrast, police must generally obtain a warrant based on probable
cause before conducting the search.4
Unfortunately, the jurisprudence that American and Canadian courts have developed in
applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test is notoriously circular, imprecise, and
unpredictable.5 In this article, I argue that this indeterminacy stems in large measure from the

1

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IX (“Fourth Amendment”).
2
“Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” CAN. CONST. (Constitution
Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 8.
3
See generally United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, 42 (Can.); R.
v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, 47 (Can.).
4
In Canada, the equivalent terminology is “reasonable and probable grounds.” See Hunter v. Southam Inc.,
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 167 (Can.) (“The state’s interest in detecting and preventing crime begins to prevail over the
individual's interest in being left alone at the point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion.”). Courts
have not consistently articulated a precise or quantifiable definition of “probable.” Some courts have treated it as
equivalent to “more likely than not,” but others have suggested that it signifies a lesser degree of probability. See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 149-50 (3d ed. 2000); R.E. SALHANY, CANADIAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE ¶ 3.1140 (6th ed. 2005). Courts in both nations have also recognized many circumstances in which,
despite the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the constitution does not require warrants, probable
cause, or either. In some situations police may obtain warrants or conduct warrantless searches on the basis of a
lesser standard of suspicion (often called “reasonable suspicion”). See LAFAVE, supra, at 148; JAMES A. FONTANA,
THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CANADA 458-59, 552-55, 595-97 (6th ed. 2005).
5
See e.g. 1WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 393-94
(3d ed., 1996); Richard Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV.

tendency of judges to think of privacy in non-instrumentalist terms. Courts typically view
privacy as a fundamental right, rooted in notions of dignity, autonomy, identity, personality, or
liberty.6 And while they often acknowledge the existence of countervailing interests, they
generally treat privacy as an unalloyed social good.7
There are several problems with this approach, which I refer to as the “moral” conception
of privacy. First, casting privacy as a moral right is normatively questionable.8 It is not at all
clear that privacy is as central to human flourishing as most deontologically-oriented jurists
claim.9 Second, to the extent that it is important, the moral approach does a poor job of
identifying the circumstances in which privacy should prevail over countervailing interests, such
as the deterrence of crime. Third, neither the Fourth Amendment nor section 8 of the Charter
protects privacy in a “fundamental” manner; they protect only the right to be free from
“unreasonable” searches and seizures.10 Even gross privacy invasions may be justified when the
state can show that they are likely to reveal evidence of serious crimes.11 As courts in both

173, 188.

6

See e.g. Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits
of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980).
7
See Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the Paradigm,
32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 871 (2000) (“Liberals have generally assumed that privacy is something people want and
that the main goal of public policy is to enhance their capacity to get what they want.”); Duarte [1990] 1 S.C.R. at
429, quoting TASK FORCE ON PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS, PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS: A REPORT OF A TASK FORCE
ESTABLISHED JOINTLY BY DEPT. OF COMMUNICATIONS/DEPT. OF JUSTICE 13 (1972) (“all information about a person
is in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for himself as he sees fit.”). See also ALAN F.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
8
The literature is replete with debates over the core meaning or meanings of privacy. See generally Daniel
J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose,
Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1976). The chief concern of this paper is informational
privacy (i.e. privacy of personal information), which is the key privacy interest implicated by government use of
advanced search and surveillance technologies. See generally Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 429-30.
9
See Richard Posner, The Right To Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 406-09 (1978).
10
See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory,
77 GEO. L.J. 19, 61-62 (1988).
11
See e.g. R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 at 517 (Can.) (recognizing that invasive bodily cavity
searches would require “greater” justification than routine pat-down and strip searches).

countries have recognized, constitutional search and seizure decisions (including threshold
reasonable expectation of privacy determinations) call for some kind of instrumentalist costbenefit calculation.12 Yet by conceptualizing privacy in moral terms, courts have largely failed to
perform this calculation with rigour, clarity, or transparency.
The intent of this article, then, is to develop a fully instrumentalist approach to the
reasonable expectation of privacy test. The obvious place to start is economic analysis. There is a
flourishing literature on the law and economics of privacy. Drawing mostly from the economics
of information,13 legal economists have taken on a wide variety of privacy issues.14 There have
been few attempts, however, to apply economic insights to search and seizure law.15 This article
aims to help fill this gap. I provide an accounting of the costs and benefits of governmental
privacy intrusions and propose a framework for making reasonable expectation of privacy
decisions that maximize social welfare.
In contrast to the prevailing moral approach, which treats privacy as a fundamental right,
12

See Hunter, [1984] 2 S.C.R at 159-60 (The reasonable expectation of privacy test is an assessment “as to
whether in a particular situation the public’s interest in being left alone by government must give way to the
government’s interest in intruding on the individual’s privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law
enforcement.”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (stressing the need to find “a workable
accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.”);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged
by balancing its intrusion on ... Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (“There can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.”). See also
Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 199,
234-36 (1993).
13
See e.g. THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION (Jack Hirshleifer, et al. eds., 1992); INES
MACHO-STADLER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS,
(2d ed., 2001).
14
See generally David Friedman, Privacy and Technology, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 186 (2000); JACK
HIRSHLEIFER, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR IN ADVERSITY 194-210 (1987); Posner, supra note 9; George Stigler, The Law
and Economics of Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1980).
15
Exceptions include Andrew Song, Technology, Terrorism, and the Fishbowl Effect: An Economic
Analysis of Surveillance and Searches (2003) at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=422220; Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H.
Mialon, The Economics of the Fourth Amendment: Crime, Search, and Anti-Utopia (2004) at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=591667; Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951

the economic approach views it as a (normatively neutral) aspect of self-interest: the desire to
conceal and control potentially damaging personal information. On this view, privacy should not
be protected when its primary effect is to impede the optimal deterrence of crime. Legal
protections against governmental surveillance, however, may in other cases enhance social
welfare by encouraging productive transactions, diminishing the costs of non-legal privacy
barriers, and limiting suboptimal policing practices, including discriminatory profiling and the
enforcement of inefficient criminal prohibitions. Economics and public choice theory can also
help to minimize decision-making error by predicting which legal actors – police, legislatures, or
courts – are best placed to make optimal trade-offs between privacy and crime control.
The article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I briefly describe the United States and
Canadian supreme courts’ reasonable expectation of privacy jurisprudence and canvass its chief
inadequacy: the indeterminacy of the “public exposure” and “intimacy” doctrines that the courts
have used to decide whether to regulate novel search technologies. Part III outlines the economic
approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Parts IV and V apply this approach to two
novel search technologies: infrared imaging and location tracking. This analysis suggests that
courts should recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the latter case, but not the former.
Part VI concludes.

(2003).

II

REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY DOCTRINE AND NOVEL SEARCH TECHNOLOGIES
The use of the reasonable expectation of privacy test dates from the United States

Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Katz v. United States.16 Katz famously departed from the
prevailing conception of Fourth Amendment searches as physical trespasses into
“constitutionally-protected” areas.17 In deciding that the placement of an electronic listening and
recording device outside a public telephone booth was a search, Justice Stewart declared in his
majority reasons that the Amendment protected “people, not places”18 and the surreptitious
interception of the petitioner’s conversation “violated the privacy upon which he justifiably
relied.”19 The “reasonable expectation” phraseology, however, stems from Justice Harlan’s
concurring reasons. He stated, in language later adopted by a majority of the Court, that to be
considered a search, it must be shown both that a person “exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy” and that the expectation be “one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”20 In its first decision interpreting section 8 of the Charter, the Supreme Court of
Canada adopted the same approach.21
How then have courts gone about deciding what constitutes a “reasonable expectation of

16

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
18
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. See also id. at 353 (“Once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects
people – and not simply ‘areas’ – against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”).
19
Id. at 353.
20
Id. at 361, Harlan J., concurring. See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984);
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
21
Hunter, [1984] 2 S.C.R at 159 (“The guarantee of security from unreasonable search and seizure only
protects a reasonable expectation.”).
17

privacy”? This is not the place to summarize the reams of doctrine on the question.22 It will be
helpful, however, to provide some sense of how the United States and Canadian supreme courts
have applied the test to novel search technologies.
Not surprisingly (and contrary to Justice Harlan’s dictum in Katz), courts have not
considered the existence of a subjective expectation of privacy to be a necessary condition of
constitutional protection;23 otherwise police could simply advertise their intention to monitor
everything capable of being monitored.24 People who were more suspicious or aware of
governmental surveillance, moreover, would receive less constitutional protection than those
more trusting or ignorant.25 The focus has instead been on the second component of Harlan’s
formula: whether an expectation of privacy is “reasonable.”
Like other reasonableness standards, the reasonable expectation of privacy test is facially
extremely vague. Insofar as it gauges “expectations” of privacy (both subjective and objective) in
relation to prevailing social and technological conditions, it is also tautological. As Wasserstrom
and Seidman have put it, “[r]easonable expectations are defined by reference to a current reality
that includes the very practices under attack, rather than by reference to the kinds of expectations
people would have in a normatively attractive society.”26 The test’s language implies that we can

22

See generally SCOTT C. HUTCHISON & JAMES C. MORTON, SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW IN CANADA,
(1990); LAFAVE, supra note 4.
23
See R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 ¶ 42 (Can.).
24
See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979); Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means
Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647,
675-76 (1988).
25
Surveillance-related paranoia could thus to some extent be a self-fulfilling prophesy. See Tessling, 3
S.C.R. ¶ 42 (“It is one thing to say that a person who puts out the garbage has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in it. It is quite another to say that someone who fears their telephone is bugged no longer has a subjective
expectation of privacy and thereby forfeits the protection of s. 8.”); Gutterman, supra note 24, at 675 (“A citizen's
unfounded belief that his private activities were not protected had a ‘self-determining’ quality: the fourth
amendment's protections as he perceived them were the maximum benefit that he could obtain.”).
26
Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 10, at 63-4.

expect less and less constitutional protection for privacy as technology continues to enhance the
power and lower the costs of surveillance.27
To be sure, courts have attempted to suffuse the test with normative content.28 They have
pointed out many of privacy’s virtues and catalogued myriad factors influencing reasonable
expectation of privacy decisions. But the key conceptual tools that the courts have developed to
aid these decisions – the public exposure and intimacy doctrines – have produced little
jurisprudential consistency, predictability, or consensus.
Public exposure – The public exposure doctrine exempts from constitutional protection
information voluntarily disclosed to the public. As Justice Stewart put it in Katz, “what a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection . . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”29 The doctrine is a natural outgrowth of liberal
moral theory. If rational, autonomous agents freely choose to expose information to the public,
then they cannot complain if others use that information against them.
It seems axiomatic that information voluntarily released into the public domain cannot
attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. The problem, of course, is that the meanings of
“voluntary” and “public” are sometimes contestable. People frequently divulge information, for

27

See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,47, Stevens J., dissenting (2001) (considering whether a senseenhancing technology is in general public use “is somewhat perverse because it seems likely that the threat to
privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.”); Cloud,
supra note 12, at 262 (“If a majority of Justices ever were to conclude that satellite technology was generally
available to the public, then its use for government surveillance would not constitute a search regulated by the
amendment.”); Gutterman supra note 24, at 720 (“The fourth amendment may now be defined solely by the degree
of sophistication used in the surveillance and the speed by which technological advances become generally
disseminated and available to the public.”).
28
See e.g. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R ¶ 42 (“Expectation of privacy is a normative rather than a descriptive
standard.”).
29
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.

example, assuming that it will be used only for certain limited purposes.30 They may also subject
themselves to observation assuming that their identities will likely remain anonymous. But what
happens when technological search tools upend these assumptions? Can we still say that there
has been a voluntary exposure?
Judges have given divergent answers to these questions. For example, the United States
and Canadian Supreme Courts have differed on the question of whether the electronic
interception of speech constitutes a “search” when one of the speakers is an undercover police
informant. As discussed, the United States Supreme Court established in Katz that surreptitious
interceptions of private communications are Fourth Amendment searches. Soon after, however, it
decided that when one of the communicators is aware of the interception, Katz does not apply.31
In White, the Court held that if the law “gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted
accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect him when that same agent has
recorded or transmitted the conversations which are later offered in evidence to prove the State’s
case.”32
The Supreme Court of Canada has taken a different approach. Following Katz, it has
unsurprisingly ruled that the surreptitious electronic interception of private communications
invades a reasonable expectation of privacy.33 But in Duarte, it rejected the “risk analysis” of

30

See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1465 (2000); R v. Dyment,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, 429-30 (Can.); R. v. Buhay, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 ¶ 22 (Can.).
31
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality) (no expectation of privacy when defendant
communicates with informant surreptitiously carrying a “wire” transmitting conversations to police). White therefore
confirmed the vitality of the Court’s pre-Katz jurisprudence on participant intercepts. See On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747 (1954) (no Fourth Amendment search where suspect’s conversations with undercover agent
transmitted to other agents via concealed radio transmitter) and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (no
Fourth Amendment search where government agent records conversation with suspect with concealed electronic
device).
32
Lopez, 373 U.S. at 752.
33
See Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R at 42 (“surreptitious electronic surveillance of the individual by an agency of

White and held that participant surveillance also constitutes a section 8 search.34 Writing for the
Court, Justice La Forest asserted that while section 8 does not protect people from the risk that
their confidants will turn out to be informers, it does prohibit the state from arbitrarily making a
“permanent electronic record” of their conversations.35 The Court similarly held in R. v. Wong
that surreptitious video surveillance (without audio interception) invades a reasonable
expectation of privacy.36
Similar differences have arisen over whether it invades a reasonable expectation of
privacy to follow a suspect’s vehicle over public roads using a surreptitiously-planted, radiofrequency tracking device. In United States v. Knotts, the United States Supreme Court held that
it did not.37 This type of surveillance, the Court reasoned, revealed no more information than
could have been obtained through visual surveillance of the vehicle from public vantage points.
“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment,” Justice Rehnquist wrote, prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science
and technology afforded them . . ..”38 In United States v. Karo, however, the Court decided that
the Fourth Amendment is engaged when beepers are used to track items within private

the state constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure under s. 8 of the Charter”); R. v. Wiggins [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62
(Can.); R. v. Thompson [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1111, 1136-37 (Can.).
34
[1990] 1 S.C.R. In so doing, the Court struck down what was then s. 178.11 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46, which exempted participant surveillance from the prohibition against warrantless electronic
surveillance.
35
Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R at 48. Note however that s. 8 of the Charter is not violated when someone privy
to an illegally recorded communication (such as an undercover agent wearing a “wire”) testifies at trial as to their
recollection of the communication, even if the participant’s memory has been refreshed by reference to the tainted
recording. But section 8 is violated when portions of an illegally obtained recording or transcript that a witness does
not recall are adduced in evidence. See R. v. Fliss [2002] 1 S.C.R. 535 (Can.).
36
Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (police placed hidden video camera in wall of suspects’ hotel room).
37
460 U.S. 276 at 281-82 (1983) (police attached beeper to a chemical container that suspect subsequently
placed in his vehicle).
38
Id. at 283.

residences.39 Unlike in Knotts, the Court noted, the beeper in Karo was used “to obtain
information that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the
house.”40
Though it seemed reluctant to do so, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded in R. v.
Wise that the use of a beeper to monitor a vehicle on public roads invaded a reasonable
expectation of privacy.41 The Court declared, however, that the invasion of privacy was
minimal.42 “This particular beeper,” the majority stated, “was a very rudimentary extension of
physical surveillance.”43
There has also been disagreement on whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists
in relation to the non-content “envelope” information accompanying electronic
communications.44 In Smith v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
installation and use of a “pen register,” which records the numbers dialled from a telephone, did
not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.45 The Court noted that the register did not record
the content of conversations and suggested that people are aware that the numbers they dial may

39

468 U.S. 705 (1984).
Id. at 715.
41
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 at 538.
42
Id. at 534-36.
43
Id. at 535. Notably, the Crown had conceded that the installation of the beeper violated section 8. Id. at
532 and 538. Not surprisingly, the Court concluded that despite the violation, the trial judge should not have
excluded evidence obtained from the beeper. Id. at 539-48. The Court also recommended the passage of legislation
authorizing tracking warrants and hinted that a “lower standard” of suspicion would be sufficient to justify them. Id.
at 548-49. As discussed infra note 142, Parliament subsequently enacted a provision authorizing the issuance of
tracking warrants on the basis of reasonable suspicion.
44
“Envelope” information refers to addressing and other information attached to a communication that is
the functional equivalent of the information contained on the outside of a letter mail envelope. See Orin Kerr,
Internet Surveillance After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 611-16 (2003).
45
442 U.S. 735 (1979) [Smith]. It is implicit in the Court’s decision that “trap and trace” devices, which
record the numbers associated with incoming telephone calls, do not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. See
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d 775, 780 (S.C., 1991) (“In light of the holding in Smith, we
cannot hold that the telephone number of the equipment from which a call has been placed is entitled to more
privacy than the telephone numbers called by someone.”).
40

be recorded for commercial and law enforcement purposes.46 In any event, it concluded, any
expectation of privacy was not reasonable, as a person has “no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”47 In Canada, in contrast, several lower
courts have found that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to telephone
envelope information and warrants to seize it must be based on reasonable and probable
grounds.48
Intimacy – As its name suggests, the intimacy doctrine holds that searches revealing
sensitive personal information are more likely to trigger a reasonable expectation of privacy than
those uncovering only mundane information. Like the public exposure doctrine, the intimacy
doctrine is intuitively appealing.49 People are less concerned about disclosing routine details of
their daily lives than potentially stigmatizing information, such as views or activities relating to
sexuality, politics, or religion. And like the public exposure doctrine, the intimacy doctrine
derives from liberal moral philosophy. For liberal privacy theorists, intimate information is more
central to autonomy, identity, and personality than non-intimate information.50
But as legal economists have pointed out, intimate information is not self-evidently

46

Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
Id. at 743-44. The Supreme Court of Canada has not considered communications envelope data. Before
1993, most lower courts had followed the United States Supreme Court in holding that the seizure of such data did
not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. In 1993, Parliament enacted a warrant provision authorizing such
seizures on the basis of reasonable suspicion. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
48
See R. v. Nguyen, 2004 BCSC 76 (use of reasonable suspicion warrant to obtain record of outgoing and
incoming telephone numbers from defendant’s mobile phone violated s. 8); R. v. Hackert, [1997] O.J. No. 6384
(Gen. Div.) (QL) (Criminal Code provision authorizing reasonable suspicion warrants for telephone envelope
information violates s. 8).
49
See generally R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, 722 (Can.) (“privacy concerns are at their strongest where
aspects of one’s individual identity are at stake, such as in the context of information ‘about one’s lifestyle, intimate
relations or political or religious opinions’.”).
50
See e.g. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890);
Bloustein, supra note 6; Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 371(2003); Jeffrey Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26 (1977); Gavison,
supra note 6, at 444-45.
47

deserving of legal protection.51 Under competitive conditions, there is no reason to protect one
party’s ability to conceal private information. In voluntary transactions (whether economic or
social), the parties’ preferences for knowledge and privacy should generate the disclosure of the
efficient amount of information.52 Granting legal protection for the concealment of discreditable
(but truthful) information is inefficient, because it increases the cost of productive transactions. If
it is inefficient to protect sellers’ ability to misrepresent the quality of their goods, then it is
equally inefficient to protect people’s ability to misrepresent their character to others.53 By
limiting our ability to discern others’ characters, trustworthiness, and other attributes, privacy
either increases the cost of or deters productive economic and social interactions.
It is inappropriate, some might argue, to analogize the state’s attempt to obtain personal
information to the sale of goods between private parties. But the case for protecting intimate,
private information from governmental scrutiny rests on the same ground as in private
transactions. While capacity of government to cause harm by collecting personal information is
great, so is people’s capacity to cause harm by concealing it. More crime is the inevitable
consequence of inhibiting government’s ability to uncover discreditable, private information.
However, as discussed in detail below, allowing police to obtain personal information by
certain means may sometimes generate suboptimal outcomes, for example when unrestricted
wiretapping would inhibit communication or induce wasteful spending on measures to protect
privacy. In such cases it may be efficient to regulate investigative methods that invade privacy.
This suggests that in determining the constitutionality of a novel search technique, courts should
focus on the methods used by police and not the nature of the information those methods reveal.
51
52

See Stigler, supra note 14 at 627.
Id.; Posner, supra note 9, at 399-400.

In most cases, this is precisely what the law does. When police can demonstrate sufficient
grounds for suspicion, they are permitted to collect highly intimate information.
Of course, courts use the reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine whether
police can search in the absence of such a demonstration. In such cases, it could be argued that
gauging the intimacy of the information revealed by a search technique helps predict whether
regulating the technique would prevent inefficient behavioural responses.
In practice, however, measuring the inherent intimacy of information has proven to be
exceedingly difficult. Courts have come to varying conclusions, for example, on the question of
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy is invaded when information normally contained in
constitutionally protected areas (such as residences, vehicles, or luggage) is extracted by “senseenhancing” technologies. Before and after Katz, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
use of flashlights and telescopic lenses does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.54 It has
come to the same conclusion with respect to the visual observation of property from the air (with
either the untrained eye or cameras), so long as the airspace is “publically navigable” and the
search is not “physically intrusive.”55 Activities that are “clearly visible” from a “public vantage
point,” the Ciraolo Court reasoned, are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.56 It warned,
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ground-level observation); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (unaided visual surveillance of partially-covered
greenhouse from 400 feet). As the Kyllo majority noted, 533 U.S. at 33, the only one of these cases in which police
used a technological aid to the naked eye (Dow), involved surveillance of commercial buildings – not a private
residence.
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476 U.S. at 213.
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however, that it might decide differently where observations are made with “modern technology
which discloses to the senses those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise
imperceptible to police or fellow citizens”57 or “highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not
generally available to the public, such as satellite technology.”58
The Court heeded this warning in Kyllo v. United States, where a narrow majority ruled
that police violated the Fourth Amendment by using an infrared camera to detect heat radiating
from an residential marijuana growing operation, despite the fact that the device was not
physically penetrating and showed only crude images of relatively warmer and cooler areas.59
“[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area’,” Justice Scalia wrote, “constitutes a search – at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use.”60 The Court came to a different conclusion
in two cases where police used drug sniffing dogs to detect narcotics concealed in airport
luggage61 and the trunk of a vehicle.62 Such searches are relatively non-intrusive, the Court
concluded, and reveal no information other than the presence of contraband.63
The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet dealt with either visual aerial surveillance or
drug sniffing dogs. Lower courts, however, have typically rejected the American approach and
found a reasonable expectation of privacy.64 But in R. v. Tessling,65 the Supreme Court
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unanimously held (on the same facts as Kyllo) that warrantless infrared camera searches did not
violate section 8 of the Charter. “Heat distribution,” Justice Binnie stated, “offers no insight into
[the suspect’s] private life, and reveals nothing of his ‘biographical core of personal
information’.”66
The limitations of the intimacy doctrine have also been exposed in a line of cases dealing
with searches of third party information databases. In United States v. Miller, the United States
Supreme Court held that prosecutors invaded no reasonable expectation of privacy when they
subpoenaed a suspect’s banking records.67 The records contained only “information voluntarily
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”68
“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another,” the Court reasoned, “that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government . . . even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”69
The Supreme Court of Canada has not dealt definitively with banking records, though
some of its members have suggested that they do attract a reasonable expectation of privacy.70
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Lower courts have come to varying conclusions.71 The Supreme Court has ruled, however, in a
case where police obtained a suspect’s electrical consumption records from the local utility.72
This did not constitute a section 8 search, Justice Sopinka concluded, because such records do
not invade that “biographical core of personal information which individuals in a free and
democratic society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state.”73 The
records, he reasoned, “cannot reasonably be said to reveal intimate details of the appellant’s life
since electricity consumption reveals very little about the personal lifestyle or private decisions
of the occupant of the residence.”74

III

THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
Can economics point the way to a more determinate and normatively satisfying approach

to the reasonable expectation of privacy test? As mentioned, economists typically view privacy
as an aspect of rational self-interest.75 They posit that privacy permits people to conceal
(discreditable) personal information that might be used to their disadvantage.76 It is in people’s
interest to maximize this ability, selectively disclosing (and thereafter controlling) their personal
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information to achieve desired ends.77 It is not always in society’s interests, however.78 If
privacy in a particular realm is used chiefly to conceal socially harmful conduct (such as crime),
then legal protection for privacy in that realm should be weak and police should be given broad
search powers. If, on the other hand, privacy encourages efficient behaviours, then legal
protections should be strong and police powers limited. Courts applying the reasonable
expectation of privacy test to an investigative technique should thus identify and weigh the costs
and benefits of limiting the state’s ability to obtain information about criminal suspects.
Privacy costs – The costs of privacy are the easiest to discern. By thwarting the detection
and punishment of criminals, legal privacy protections generate two types of social costs. First,
most crimes are inefficient,79 so privacy laws detract from social welfare by diminishing the
deterrence of crime. For example, if police cannot use electronic surveillance to acquire evidence
to support an application to obtain a warrant to physically search a suspected drug dealer’s home,
and there is no other equally effective investigative technique available, fewer physical searches
will occur, diminishing the probability of punishment and thus the expected cost of dealing
drugs. Drug dealing will thus become a more attractive endeavour. Second, by restricting the use
of particular search techniques, privacy laws may force authorities to use more costly
substitutes.80 For example, if police replace electronic surveillance with undercover informants,
law enforcement costs may rise, as undercover operations are very likely more expensive and
dangerous than electronic surveillance.
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80
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Privacy benefits – Though privacy’s social benefits are somewhat more obscure, they are
by no means insignificant. While privacy makes it easier for people to engage in antisocial
conduct (including crime), it may also provide an incentive for productive activity.81 Privacy
may thus reduce “avoidance costs”; that is, the opportunity cost entailed when people forgo
socially beneficial transactions fearing the disclosure of information that could be used against
them. There are two types of avoidance costs that privacy laws can mitigate. First, privacy
enhances the quantity and quality of interpersonal communications. For example, legal
restrictions on eavesdropping (by police or nosy neighbours) free people to communicate more
candidly.82 Privacy diminishes the risk that information that we rationally disclose to intended
recipients will be obtained (and used to our detriment) by unintended recipients.83 Conversely,
widespread eavesdropping causes people to be more formal and guarded in their communications
– not only in relation to criminal conversations but also those revealing discreditable (but noncriminal) information.84 As Richard Posner puts it, the “principal effect of allowing
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eavesdropping would not be to make the rest of society more informed about the individual but
to make conversations more cumbersome and less effective.”85 This helps to explain why legal
protections against invasions of communicative privacy are so robust.86
Second, privacy (in the form of anonymity) may encourage people to participate in
beneficial activities that they would not engage in otherwise.87 This is a social benefit that must
be measured against privacy’s impact in promoting crime. If teenagers were required to provide
proof of identity before purchasing condoms, for example, sexually transmitted diseases
unwanted pregnancies would become more prevalent. Similarly, the placement of video
surveillance cameras in a high-crime neighbourhood could dissuade people from using nearby
needle exchanges or AIDS clinics.
Privacy laws may also reduce the costs associated with protecting privacy by non-legal
means (“defensive costs”).88 Instead of avoiding communications or activities that could reveal
personal information, people may wastefully expend resources to protect their privacy.89 Without
wiretapping laws, for example, people would be more likely to use public payphones instead of
their own phones.
In the absence of legal privacy protections, the likelihood that people will employ nonone talks to a recorder as he talks to a person.”); Fliss, [2002] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 49 (“In a free country, social discourse
should not be inhibited by a concern that conversations are being secretly recorded and transcribed without lawful
independent prior authorization.”).
85
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legal substitutes depends on both the price of those substitutes and the elasticity of the demand
for privacy. This insight may determine when it is cost-justified to regulate governmental
surveillance. Suppose that there were no law limiting police’s ability to intercept or search email
communications. People using email for non-criminal purposes could rationally conclude that the
marginal private benefit of encrypting email is lower than its cost.90 Such persons would suffer
the costs incurred by either exposing sensitive information or avoiding doing so with email. The
marginal private benefit of using encryption for criminal purposes, in contrast, will in most cases
be higher than for non-criminal purposes. Criminals are consequently more likely to use
encryption to thwart governmental surveillance than non-criminals. In these circumstances,
regulating the state’s ability to obtain email communications is likely to reduce non-criminals’
avoidance costs without substantially diminishing the deterrence of crime.
So far I have been discussing the value of privacy in fostering socially productive noncriminal discourse and activity. I have assumed that there is no value in protecting people against
governmental intrusions revealing criminal behaviour. This assumption can be questioned.
Where there is a strong consensus that the harms caused by a type of crime are severe, we should
be willing to tolerate the use of fairly intrusive investigative methods to deter it,91 provided that
productive non-criminal behaviour is not unduly chilled. Privacy invasions are less acceptable,
however, when this consensus is not as strong, as is arguably the case for many “consensual”
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crimes like drug trafficking, prostitution, and gambling.92 Put in economic terms, enforcing these
prohibitions (or enforcing them through privacy-invasive techniques) may be inefficient, as
enforcement costs may outweigh the harms generated by the prohibited activities.93 In some
cases, therefore, legal privacy protections may help to limit the enforcement of bad laws.
Privacy laws may also help to prevent governments from discriminating against
disfavoured minorities.94 Broad, discretionary investigative powers are more likely to be used
against those disadvantaged by poverty, race, or ethnicity than powers constrained by the
requirements of prior authorization and probable cause.95 These requirements increase the
likelihood that searches will be based on concrete, individualized suspicion – not discriminatory
stereotypes.
But what exactly is discriminatory stereotyping? Economists distinguish between
“biased” profiling (based on animus towards members of a minority group) and “statistical”
profiling (arising from the disproportionate targeting of group members based on an accurate
assessment of that group’s offending rate).96 If group members are more likely to commit a
particular offence than people in the general population, then many economists would say that it
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is legitimate to consider group membership in deciding who to investigate.97 If, on the other
hand, offence rates for a particular crime are equal as between groups, then it is likely that any
inter-group disparity in arrest rates reflects bias against the group with the higher arrest rate.98
Which of these scenarios is closer to reality? Numerous studies have shown that in many
places in the United States, police are more likely to stop and search African American and
Hispanic drivers than white drivers.99 But explanations for this disparity vary. Some researchers
argue that for offences typically associated with “racial profiling,”100 minority and majority
offending rates are generally similar; they conclude therefore that any disproportionate targeting
of minorities indicates bias.101 However, many of the studies showing disproportionate stop rates
have also found that majority and minority “hit” rates (i.e. the ratio of successful to unsuccessful
97
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searches) are very similar; this is consistent, some have argued, with legitimate statistical
discrimination based on higher minority offending rates.102
Despite the ambiguity of the American data, and the dearth of Canadian evidence, there
are good reasons to think that biased profiling is widespread in both countries, and that it likely
generates significant social costs that in most cases outweigh any concomitant benefits. There is
strong evidence, for example, that police in several U.S. states search Hispanic motorists much
more frequently than could be explained by statistical discrimination.103 And rigorously designed
psychological experimentation has shown that racial, ethnic, and gender stereotyping is
pervasive and insidious.104 This research supports the growing recognition among jurists,
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especially in Canada, that racial bias (including biased investigative profiling) is an endemic
feature of the criminal justice system.105
Moreover, even unbiased, statistical profiling may generate undesirable distributive
outcomes.106 And even if we restrict our assessment of profiling’s social costs to conventional
economic concerns, it is not clear that statistical profiling is efficient. As Bernard Harcourt has
argued, law enforcement efficiency is not achieved by equalizing hit rates; but rather by
minimizing both crime and enforcement costs.107 Profiling is efficient, therefore, only when it: (i)
reduces the amount of profiled crime;108 (ii) does not diminish the efficient allocation of police

explicit commitments in favor of racial equality. In other words, even if our sincere self-reports of
bias score zero, we would still engage in disparate treatment of individuals on the basis of race,
consistent with our racial schemas. Controlled, deliberative, rational processes are not the only
forces guiding our behavior. That we are not even aware of, much less intending, such racecontingent behavior does not magically erase the harm.
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resources; and (iii) does not produce a “ratchet effect”109 on the profiled population.110
Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to determine directly whether highway profiling meets
these conditions. But drawing from other data sources, Harcourt argues that it probably does not.
Minority drivers likely have slightly lower elasticities of offending to policing than white
drivers111 as well as slightly higher natural offending rates.112 As a consequence, racial profiling
is likely to both increase the crime rate (due to diminished deterrence of white drivers) and cause
a ratchet effect in minority populations (resulting in disproportionate arrests and convictions over
and above any natural higher offending rate).113 As Harcourt notes, this increase in negative
contacts with police “will aggravate the disproportional representation of minorities in the
correctional population, more unevenly distribute criminal records, supervision, and postpunitive collateral consequences, and significantly boost the public perception that minorities are
drug users, traffickers, and couriers.”114
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A “ratchet effect” occurs when profiling “produces a supervised population that is disproportionate to
the distribution of offending by racial group.” Id. at 1329. By unjustifiably targeting group members, profiling may
increase the group’s crime rate (as measured by arrest or conviction rates, not actual offending, since the former is
always a fraction of the latter), thereby providing (false) justification for further wasteful profiling.
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Id. at 1279-80.
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This may result from minorities having fewer non-criminal employment opportunities as well as cultural
factors. Id. at 1282, 1299, 1356-57. See also Persico, supra note 102 at 1474.
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This is largely a product of greater minority participation in drug trafficking. Harcourt, supra note 107,
at 1282, 1371.
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Id. at 1282, 1297-99, 1330-35, 1371-73.
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Id. at 1282. See also id. at 1329-31 as well as Dominitz, supra note 102, at 425 (“[W]hen police officers
use race-ethnicity in stop and search decisions, the rate of apprehension of the guilty will be higher for those groups
that are searched at a higher rate . . .”). Note that Harcourt’s approach does not require making a distinction between
biased and statistical profiling. In his estimation, the evidence shows that profiling, whatever the police’s
motivation, is likely inefficient and counterproductive. As he states at 1306-07, “[i]If targeting minority motorists
increases long-term offending on the highways or the overall costs to society, then it is in effect racially prejudiced.
It may be inadvertent and mistaken, but it is effectively racist because it uses a racial category without any benefit to
society.”
It has also been argued that racial profiling (whether biased or statistical) may also lead to higher rates of
false arrests among minorities. Tomic and Hakes report that dismissal rates for African Americans charged with
offences typically associated with racial profiling are higher than those for whites as well as for African Americans

Search and seizure law is neither the only nor the most direct means of combatting
discriminatory profiling.115 But it is very difficult to mitigate profiling directly.116 Proving bias in
any individual case is challenging (to say the least), and evidence of statistical disproportion
cannot in itself prove that any particular search is illegitimate.117
One of the most effective ways to diminish discriminatory profiling may therefore be to
limit the ability of police to conduct discretionary searches. As discussed, if a court finds that an
investigative technique does not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the technique is
not a “search” and police may use it without restriction. In applying the reasonable expectation
of privacy test to a novel search technique, courts should therefore consider the extent to which
the technique is likely to be used in a discriminatory manner.
Decision-making error – Constitutional provisions in the Canada and the United States
command courts to protect people against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures.
These provisions, of course, are not the only sources of such protection. In both countries,
legislatures regulate search powers exercised by executive authorities, and those authorities
regulate themselves with various non-legal mechanisms, including official policies and informal
charged with other offences. This disparity is lower in counties with a greater proportion of African American police
officers as well as in those with locally-elected judges and high proportions of African Americans. See Aleksandar
Tomic & Jahn K. Hakes, Case Dismissed: New Evidence in Racial Profiling (September 2004) at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=618122.
115

See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 138-63 (1997); David M. Tanovich,
Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an Equality Based Conception of Arbitrary
Detention, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 145 (2002); Kent Roach, Making Progress on Understanding and Remedying
Racial Profiling, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 895 (2004); Tim Quigley, Brief Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v.
Simpson, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 935 (2004); Sujit Choudhy, Protecting Equality in the Face of Terror: Ethnic and
Racial Profiling and s. 15 of the Charter, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA’S ANTI-TERRORISM
BILL 367 (Ronald J.Daniels, et al, eds. 2001)
116
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See Stuntz, supra note 87, at 2162-63, 2177-79.

Id. But see Brown, 64 O.R. ¶ 45 (“[W]here the evidence shows that the circumstances relating to a
detention correspond to the phenomenon of racial profiling and provide a basis for the court to infer that the police
officer is lying about why he or she singled out the accused person for attention, the record is then capable of

norms. Microeconomic analysis and its public law offshoot, public choice theory, can help
determine which branch of government is best placed to undertake such regulation. Cost-benefit
calculations are made by self-interested decisionmakers with imperfect information.118 Judges
share these imperfections, but they have some capacity to develop rules that take their own and
others’ weaknesses into account.119 Identifying the biases and information-gathering deficits of
courts, legislatures, and police should reduce the frequency and magnitude of the errors that the
reasonable expectation of privacy test inevitably generates.
The deficits of police are obvious. While they may face pressure to avoid egregious
privacy intrusions, the incentives bearing on them tilt heavily against investigative restraint. As
individuals and institutions, police are rewarded primarily for minimizing crime, and the benefits
of intrusive search techniques in achieving this objective are clear. In contrast, apart from
budgetary constraints, the social costs of surveillance (such as those detailed above) are abstract,
diffuse, and largely externalized; police accordingly have little incentive to either discover or
take them into account in exercising discretionary investigative powers.120 Police also lack the
institutional means to perform the kind of comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that the
reasonable expectation of privacy test entails. Consequently, while crime control interests must
obviously be considered in applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test, courts should not
show any significant degree of deference to police assessments of the necessity of a search

supporting a finding that the stop was based on racial profiling.”).
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See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence
of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
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See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second Order Decisions, in BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS 187 (Cass R. Sunstein, ed. 2000).
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See Brown, supra note 93, at 361; Stuntz, supra note 87, at 2179

technique.
Legislatures and courts are primarily responsible, therefore, for attaining an optimal
balance between privacy and crime control. The key question for judges in applying the
reasonable expectation of privacy test, then, is to what extent they should defer to legislative
decisions to regulate or decline to regulate a particular investigative technique.
Legislatures generally have better access than courts to information important to accurate
decision-making in this area. This information comes in two varieties. First, unlike judges,
legislators are politically accountable, and are thus in a better position to gauge citizens’
preferences for privacy and crime control. Second, legislatures have better access to information
on the nature and effects of investigative methods. This advantage is especially apparent in the
context of novel, technologically sophisticated search tools. In dealing with such matters,
legislatures typically seek input from a variety of sources, including not only law enforcement
agencies but also industry, advocacy groups, academics, technical experts, and the general
public.121 The ability of courts to obtain expert assistance and canvass the views of diverse
stakeholders is much more limited.122
Legislatures are also typically able to deal with new technologies more quickly than
courts. Most judicial rule-making is performed by appellate courts, which usually encounter
novel search technologies many years after they are in use, and even then only if relevant cases
are tried and appealed.123 By this time the factual record undergirding the rule-making process
121

See e.g. SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS TO THE LAWFUL ACCESS CONSULTATION (Nevis Consulting Group,

ed., 2003).
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See Kerr, supra note 44, at 875-76; Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
245, 261-63 (2002). See also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretations and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885 (2003); William J. Stuntz, Accountable Policing (February 21, 2006), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=886170.
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See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for

may be outdated.124 Legislation is also often overtaken by technological developments; but here
as well legislatures are better equipped to respond flexibly to changing circumstances. Unlike
courts, legislatures can adopt measures to ensure that statutory provisions are periodically
reviewed. Courts, in contrast, are constrained by stare decisis,125 and in the realm of
constitutional interpretation, they also impose constraints on legislative action.126
All of this suggests that courts should be reluctant to usurp the legislature’s capacity to
regulate the use of novel search technologies as it sees fit. Public choice scholarship teaches us,
however, that the legislative process may be skewed in favour of motivated and powerful interest
groups.127 Consequently, the interests of groups disproportionately harmed by legislation may be
systematically discounted.128 It is often asserted, for example, that the legislative process
operates as a one-way ratchet in the criminal sphere.129 On this view, legislatures respond

Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 868-69 (2004).
124

See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the
Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 272 (1999).
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See Kerr, supra note 123, at 871-73. Many of the enhanced investigative powers enacted by Congress
and Parliament in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, for example, were made
subject to “sunset” clauses mandating expiry after a certain period absent legislative renewal. See Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot)
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, §§ 202, 206, 209, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218, 220; Criminal Code, §
83.32.
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See Stuntz, supra note 122, at 34-41.
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See generally PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (Maxwell L. Stearns,
ed., 1997); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1965); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
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See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). As William Stuntz has put it
“[a]nytime the government does something that has concentrated costs but diffused benefits, there is a danger that it
will do too much – harming one voter to please ten is generally thought to be a good deal from the point of view of
politically accountable decisionmakers.” Stuntz, supra note 122, at 2165.
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See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why
Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused? 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993); Stephen B.
Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J.
1835, 1870 (1994); Charles Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 83-85 (1995). But see Stuntz, supra note 122, at 19 (“Contrary to the popular wisdom,
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robustly to demands for greater investigative powers and harsher sanctions from police,
prosecutors, victims, and the crime-fearing public while ignoring calls from defence lawyers,
civil libertarians, and academics for greater police regulation and punitive restraint.130
Some commentators have argued that this may often be true of search and seizure laws,
which as we have seen sometimes impose disproportionate costs on politically marginal groups
(such as certain racial and ethnic minorities).131 It would be a mistake to assume, however, that
legislatures are always incapable of tempering demands for intrusive search and surveillance
powers.132 When a surveillance technique threatens to impose substantial costs on a broad or
politically powerful segment of the population, the legislature will often be pressured to regulate
it.133 Indeed, in most cases Congress has regulated new search technologies long before the
courts have encountered them.134 And in cases where the Supreme Court has found that a
technology does not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, Congress has often intervened to
regulate it. For example, after the Court held that pen registers are not Fourth Amendment
searches,135 Congress responded with legislation prohibiting their use without a court order.136
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See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 553-56
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(1999).
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Similarly, after lower courts found no reasonable expectation of privacy in cordless telephone
conversations,137 Congress enacted provisions protecting them.138 And after the Supreme Court
concluded that bank records attract no reasonable expectation of privacy,139 Congress prohibited
authorities from obtaining them without a subpoena, warrant, or formal written request providing
grounds for the search.140
In the pre-Charter era, the Canadian Parliament was similarly proactive in protecting
privacy against intrusive surveillance technologies.141 This effort lagged somewhat in the first
two decades after the passage of the Charter, when Parliament was forced to respond to a series
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Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3121 et seq. (2006). Law enforcement agencies
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1984). To obtain banking
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of assertive section 8 decisions by the Supreme Court.142 Yet even during this period, Parliament
took the lead over the courts in protecting privacy in a number of areas. After two courts found
that pen registers did not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy,143 Parliament authorized the
issuance of “number recorder” warrants on the basis of reasonable suspicion.144 And after one
court determined that wireless telephone communications might not be subject to the same
statutory protections as land line calls,145 Parliament passed legislation clarifying that most
wireless calls are protected.146
Courts should generally be reluctant, then, to preempt the legislature’s decision to
regulate (or decline to regulate) novel surveillance techniques. They should be especially
deferential when dealing with sophisticated and rapidly changing search technologies whose
142

As discussed, in Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, the Court struck down what was then s. 178.11 of the
Criminal Code, which exempted participant surveillance from the prohibition of warrantless electronic surveillance.
The Criminal Code was subsequently amended to permit warrantless participant surveillance in two circumstances:
(i) as protection for undercover agents (in which case any evidence obtained is inadmissible); and (ii) when police
obtain a warrant based on reasonable and probable grounds. Criminal Code, §§ 184.1, 184.2. Recall as well that in
Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, the Court held that surreptitious, video-only surveillance (which the Criminal Code has
never prohibited) of a hotel room invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy. Parliament responded by enacting a
provision allowing police to obtain warrants to conduct video surveillance on reasonable and probable cause.
Criminal Code, § 487.01. And in Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, the Court concluded that the installation and
monitoring of a tracking device invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy. Parliament soon thereafter authorized
the granting of tracking warrants on the basis of reasonable suspicion. Criminal Code, § 492.1.
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the reasonable suspicion standard in place of reasonable and probable grounds violates s. 8 of the Charter. See
Nguyen, 2004 BCSC 76; Hackert, [1997] O.J. No. 6384.
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Section 183 of the Criminal Code now specifies that any radio-based telephone communication that “is
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social costs are likely to be distributed across a broad segment of society.147 Less deference may
be warranted when the costs of a technique are likely to be borne disproportionately by “discrete
and insular minorities” with little political power.148 Concluding that a technique invades a
reasonable expectation of privacy (and is hence subject to privacy-protecting regulation)
improves the odds that its costs will be internalized by society as a whole.149
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26-7; Brown, supra note 93, at 343. Judges are just as likely, however, to suffer from these limitations as legislators.
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This assumes that economically privileged, unelected judges are better attuned to the problem of law
enforcement discrimination than legislators. This assumption has been questioned. See Wasserstrom & Seidman,
supra note 10, at 100. However, on account of their extensive experience with police-citizen encounters and relative
insulation from majoritarian pressures, judges may be able to discern differential impacts on privacy that are likely
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IV

INFRARED CAMERA SEARCHES
To illustrate how economically-informed cost-benefit analysis can improve the

conventional reasonable expectation of privacy test, consider the use of infrared cameras to
detect indoor marijuana cultivation operations. Recall that in Kyllo, the United States Supreme
Court held that residential infrared camera searches invade a reasonable expectation of privacy
and that in Tessling, the Canadian Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion.150 The
Tessling Court described the capabilities of infrared cameras as follows:
FLIR151 technology records images of thermal energy or heat radiating from a
building. Once a baseline is calibrated, cooler areas show up as dark, and warmer
areas are lighter. FLIR imaging cannot, at this stage of its development, determine
the nature of the source of heat within the building. It cannot distinguish between
heat diffused over an external wall that came originally from a sauna or a pottery
kiln, or between heat that originated in an overheated toaster or heat from a halide
lamp. In short, the FLIR camera cannot “see” through the external surfaces of a
building. . . . However, the substantial amounts of heat generated by marijuana
growing operations must eventually escape from the building. The FLIR camera
creates an image of the distribution of escaping heat at a level of detail not
discernible by the naked eye. A FLIR image, put together with other information,
can help the police get reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a
marijuana growing operation is in residence.152
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Note that these results do not fit the general pattern of the respective courts’ recent search and seizure
decisions. The United States court has generally been more accommodating of law enforcement interests than its
Canadian counterpart. See supra notes 31-74 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that each of the two
camps in Kyllo consisted of a curious amalgam of conservatives and liberals. The justices in the majority were
Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Chief Justice Renquist, along with Justices O’Connor,
Stevens, and Kennedy dissented.
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“FLIR” stands for “Forward Looking Infra-Red.” See Tessling [2004] 3 S.C.R. ¶ 2.

Tessling [2004] 3 S.C.R. ¶ 5. The device used in Kyllo was described as a “non-intrusive device which
emits no rays or beams and shows a crude visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house; it
did not show any people or activity within the walls of the structure; the device used cannot penetrate walls or
windows to reveal conversations or human activities; and no intimate details of the home were observed.” Kyllo, at
30, quoting from the evidentiary findings of the District Court (internal quotation marks omitted).

Though both courts invoked the public exposure and intimacy doctrines, neither doctrine
proved particularly helpful. Justice Scalia began his majority decision in Kyllo by noting that the
visual inspection of a dwelling (from any publically accessible vantage point) is not a search.153
He quickly concluded, however, that infrared searches differ from “naked eye surveillance”
because they allow police to obtain “information regarding the interior of the home that could
not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area’.”154 Scalia found, in other words, that Kyllo did not voluntarily expose the heat radiating
from his home to public observation.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Kyllo dissenters, took a different approach. In his view,
infrared cameras do not give police direct access to private information; rather, they merely help
them to infer what is going on inside residences from “information in the public domain.”155
Expressly applying the public exposure doctrine, he concluded that infrared camera searches
could not be constitutionally distinguished from naked eye observations of heat emanations, as
when someone notices that “one part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby building
if, for example, rainwater evaporates or snow melts at different rates across its surfaces.”156
In Tessling, the Supreme Court of Canada treated the public exposure doctrine with more
ambivalence. In assessing whether Tessling had a subjective expectation of privacy in his home’s
thermal profile, Justice Binnie asserted that “allowing” heat to escape does not count as a
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knowing or voluntary exposure.157 In determining the objective reasonableness of any
expectation of privacy, however, he noted that heat loss from external walls is “obvious to even
the most casual observer”158 and while an infrared camera reveals more detail than is apparent to
the naked eye, it nonetheless “records only information exposed to the public.”159
There is no way to determine which of the forgoing approaches is correct. The dissipation
of thermal energy is inevitable,160 and in many circumstances differential heat production will be
visually discernable. It is also true that infrared imaging produces a more detailed picture of heat
distribution than is apparent in the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum. Attempting to
categorize the information revealed by infrared searches as “public” or “private” or emanating
from a home’s “exterior” or “interior” is a fruitless endeavour.
It is perhaps for this reason that Tessling Court and the Kyllo dissent focussed on the
nature of the information obtained by infrared searches, concluding that they revealed only nonintimate information.161 This argument has some merit. The images in Kyllo and Tessling
allowed police to make only general inferences about the nature of the activities taking place
inside the home. Justice Scalia had a point, however, when he stated that “in the home . . . all
details are intimate details.”162 He questioned whether it would be possible to articulate a
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standard “specifying which residential activities are ‘intimate’ and which are not.”163
Assessments of intimacy vary widely depending on subjective preferences, context, and the
extent to which information from disparate sources is compiled and aggregated. The infrared
images produced in Kyllo and Tessling were crude, but combined with other information, they
could nonetheless generate probabilistic inferences about a number of non-criminal activities that
some people would prefer to keep private.164 While it can be argued that the information
uncovered by infrared cameras is not especially sensitive, ultimately the intimacy doctrine is
only marginally more helpful than the public exposure doctrine in deciding whether the
technology invades a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Economic cost-benefit analysis promises to provide a more definitive answer to this
question.
Privacy costs – Consider first the social costs that would ensue if infrared searches were
held to invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. When a court finds such an expectation, it
subjects the search technique to constitutional regulation, usually by requiring police to obtain a
probable cause warrant. Even if we assume that police could obtain infrared warrants on a lesser
standard (such as reasonable suspicion), the costs would be substantial. Police would be forced to
rely on more expensive and riskier investigative methods (such as undercover operations) either
as substitutes for infrared searches or to provide evidentiary foundations for warrant
163
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Id. at 38-39.

Justice Scalia asserted, for example, that the infrared technology used in Kyllo may have permitted
police to determine “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.” Id. at 38. See also
United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated and decided on other grounds, 83 F.3d
1247 (10th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“While the heat lost by a building is data of some limited value, the true worth of
the device – the very reason that the government turned the imager on the home of the Defendants – is predicated
upon the translation of these thermal records into intelligible (albeit speculative) information about the activities that

applications.165 Higher costs mean less enforcement and less deterrence.
Privacy benefits – Our willingness to bear these costs depends on the magnitude of the
benefits that a warrant requirement would produce. In the absence of legal privacy protections,
people may either avoid productive activities or defend their privacy by other means.
Unrestricted infrared searches are unlikely to produce either avoidance or defensive costs. As
discussed, even crude infrared images may permit probabilistic inferences about non-criminal
residential activity, and some may not want police to have unrestricted access to this information.
But for people who are not growing marijuana, knowing that police might be monitoring heat
escaping from their homes is unlikely to prompt any behavioural changes, let alone chill
participation in socially valuable discourse or activity. The fact that electricity consumption
records have been freely available to police for years does not appear to have prompted people to
modify their residential activities.166 Similarly, the widespread use of infrared cameras is not
likely to cause law-abiding individuals to install better insulation or find other means of limiting
the escape of heat from their homes.
The next question is whether regulating infrared searches is likely to prevent suboptimal
enforcement expenditures. At first blush, the marijuana prohibition might appear to be the kind
of inefficient law that privacy rights should aim to thwart.167 The economic case for legalizing

generate the observed heat.”).
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This remains true even if it is assumed that infrared images must usually be supplemented by
corroborating evidence to establish probable cause to conduct physical searches. See Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. ¶ 55
(“at present no warrant could ever properly be granted solely on the basis of a FLIR image.”). Prohibiting infrared
searches in the absence of reasonable suspicion would increase the need for corroborating evidence.
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See Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281.

There is a hint of this reasoning in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tessling. See R. v. Tessling, 171
C.C.C. (3d) 361 ¶ 81 (Ont. C.A. 2003.) (“there has been public, judicial, and political recognition that marijuana is

marijuana (and perhaps other illicit drugs) is strong.168 There is considerable evidence that the
costs of enforcement vastly outweigh the harms of consumption.169 But even if this is correct, it
does not follow that privacy law should be used to hamper the ability of police to detect
producers. As long as marijuana trafficking remains illegal, a substantial portion of its profits
will flow to people involved in broader criminal enterprises.170 Restricting infrared searches
would diminish the risk of detection, thereby lowering the costs of entry into the trade and
increasing revenues available to finance crimes causing substantial social harm. It would also
lead to an increase in violence and other criminal activity associated with competition between
producers.171 If the marijuana prohibition is a bad law, then we should press for its reform or
abolition – not use privacy law to promote the growth of an illicit market.172
The discretionary use of infrared searches is also unlikely to encourage discriminatory
profiling. This most likely to occur when police can readily observe the profiled characteristic
(such as race) and use it as a proxy for criminality, as in street and vehicle stops, airport security

at the lower end of the hierarchy of harmful drugs”).
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See Gary S. Becker, et al., The Market for Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs, 114 J. POL. ECON. 38
(2006); Cooter & Ulen, supra note 79, at 479-84 (reviewing theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrating the
inefficiency of the “war on drugs.”).
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See e.g. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE NON-MEDICAL USE OF DRUGS, CANNABIS: A REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE NON-MEDICAL USE OF DRUGS (1972). See also R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v.
Caine [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (Can.); R. v. Parker, 146 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A. 2000).
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See Paul J. Goldstein, et al., Drug-Related Homicide in New York: 1984 and 1988, 38 CRIME & DELINQ.

459 (1992).
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See Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang’s
Finances, 115 QUART. J. ECON. 755 (2000).
172

The former Canadian government’s proposed legislation decriminalizing the possession of small
quantities of marijuana suggests that Parliament may be becoming more amenable to such reform. See Bill C-17, An
Act to Amend the Contraventions Act and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2004 (first
reading November 1, 2004).

checks, and border crossings.173 Police using infrared cameras, in contrast, are less likely to be
aware of the suspect’s race or ethnicity.174 The immediate targets of the searches, after all, are
buildings – not people. Further, unlike detentions and physical searches of pedestrians, drivers,
and air travellers, infrared searches are unlikely to cause innocent suspects to feel
inconvenienced, embarrassed, or stigmatized (feelings that often generate a profound sense of
unfairness among the innocent targets of profiling). Indeed, in most cases the innocent subjects
of infrared searches will never become aware that they have been searched.
Decision-making error – Even if the forgoing analysis underestimates the costs or
overestimates the benefits of unregulated infrared searches, we should still prefer the result in
Tessling to that in Kyllo. Like many other novel search technologies, the uses and capabilities of
infrared imaging are changing rapidly.175 These are precisely the circumstances in which courts
should be reluctant to preempt the legislature’s ability to craft (and adjust) a nuanced and flexible
regulatory scheme.
The majority opinion in Kyllo illustrates the drawbacks of judicial interventionism in the
realm of high technology. Anxious to set out a firm, bright-line rule capable of anticipating
future technological developments,176 Justice Scalia proclaimed that “obtaining by sense173

See sources cited supra note 99.
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In cases where police do target members of a minority group in marijuana investigations, evidence of
discrimination will often be readily apparent. In R. v. Nguyen [2006] O.J. No. 272 (Sup. Ct. Jus.) (QL), for example,
the court found that a police officer engaged in unconstitutional racial profiling when he obtained from a local land
registry office a list containing only the names of property owners with Vietnamese surnames.
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See Jeffrey P. Campisi, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Constitutionality of
Thermal Imaging, Vill. L. Rev. 241, 270-75 (2001) (discussing state of current thermal imaging technology and
future developments); George M. Dery, Lying Eyes: Constitutional Implications of New Thermal Imaging Lie
Detection Technology, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 217 (2004) (discussing use of infrared cameras to detect facial blood flow
patterns consistent with deception).
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See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 ( “While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule

enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ .
. . constitutes a search – at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general
public use.”177 The “general public use” criterion, however, is both vague and normatively
troubling.178 Since Kyllo was decided, infrared cameras have become more affordable, portable,
and user-friendly; they are currently used in a wide variety of law enforcement, immigration,
military, and civilian applications, including construction, manufacturing, testing, and
inspection.179 How are police, prosecutors, and courts to determine when infrared cameras are so
ubiquitous as to be in “general public use?” And if the courts eventually decide that they are,
would this mean that they could never invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, even if they
become capable of capturing detailed images of residential life?
If infrared imaging advances to this point, and if its use by police threatens to generate
significant avoidance or defensive costs, legislatures can intervene and regulate it. As infrared
searches have the potential to impact a broad segment of society, the issue is best left to the
legislative process. Technology enabling police to “see” what is going on inside the home is
likely to prompt strong political opposition. In these circumstances, legislatures are more likely
to achieve an optimal balance of privacy and security than the courts.180
we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”).
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Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
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See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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See e.g. FLIR at http://www.flir.com; Advanced Infrared Resources at
http://www.infraredthermography.com/applicat.htm.
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For example, in an effort to minimize the intrusiveness of infrared searches, legislation could set out a
list of “approved” infrared cameras, with detailed specifications for their use, as has been done in the context of
blood alcohol screening and measuring devices. See Criminal Code, § 254.

V

LOCATION TRACKING
A similar analysis can be performed with respect to a very different surveillance

technology: location tracking devices. Early iterations of this technology were considered in
Knotts,181 Karo,182 and Wise.183 Recall that in Knotts and Karo, the United States Supreme Court
held that tracking suspects with surreptitiously planted radio transmitters (“beepers”) did not
invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, as long as they did not allow police to monitor
constitutionally protected areas, such as residences. In Wise, in contrast, the Supreme Court of
Canada concluded that tracking a suspect’s vehicle over public roads infringed a reasonable
expectation of privacy, albeit only in a “minimally intrusive” manner.184
By today’s standards, the technology used in these cases was rudimentary. The Court
described the beeper used in Wise as follows:
The device consisted of a low power radio transmitter. From the strength of the
signal, it was possible to determine the general location of the object to which the
beeper had been fixed. By moving in the direction of the transmitter and adjusting
the “RF gain control,” the location could be more precisely determined. The
device used in this case was not capable of indicating if the object being tracked
was to the right, left, front or back of the receiver of the signal.
The evidence in this case was that the device was used intermittently as a back-up
for visual surveillance of the appellant’s car . . . particularly to attempt to locate
the vehicle when visual surveillance failed. Since the device was not capable of
pinpointing the vehicle with any degree of precision, physical surveillance was
always required to fix its proximate position.185
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460 U.S. 276.
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468 U.S. 705.
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[1992] 1 S.C.R. 527.
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Id. at 538.
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Id. at 434-35. The capabilities of the devices used in Knotts and Karo were roughly similar. In both
cases the beeper was used as a supplement to, and not a complete substitute for, traditional physical surveillance.

Tracking devices are now much more powerful and precise. Two sophisticated
technologies are already in widespread use: the Global Positioning System (GPS) and wireless
telephone networks.186 Like traditional beepers, these technologies use radio waves to establish a
connection between devices at unknown locations and devices at known locations. The newer
technologies, however, have two critical advantages over beepers. Unlike a beeper, which must
remain within a certain distance of its tracking receiver, GPS and wireless phone tracking
devices are linked to an extensive, permanent network of transceivers. This allows police to track
suspects from a remote, stationary location, thus eliminating the need for mobile, physical
surveillance.187 Second, because GPS devices and wireless phones can send data to and receive
data from multiple network nodes simultaneously, the suspect’s precise location can be
determined mathematically.188 As noted in Wise, a beeper’s location can only be inferred
imprecisely by gauging the strength of its signal.
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There are a number of other widely-used technologies that allow police to determine suspects’ locations,
including public transit passes and toll road transponders, both of which record the time and the pass holders’
identity at points of ingress and egress. Unlike GPS and wireless telephone networks, however, these technologies
are not capable of tracking suspects’ movements on a continuous basis. See generally Brendan I. Koerner, Your
Cellphone is a Homing Device, LEGAL AFFAIRS (July/August 2003), at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/JulyAugust-2003/feature_koerner_julaug03.msp. Video monitoring systems are capable of continuous surveillance, so
long as suspects’ movements occur within the range of the camera network. See generally Renée M. Pomerance,
Redefining Privacy in the Face of New Technologies: Data Mining and the Threat to the “Inviolate Personality”, 9
CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 273 (2005); Gérard La Forest, Opinion: Video Surveillance (5 April 2002), Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/media/nr-c/opinion_020410_e.asp.
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See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223-24 (Wash. S.C. 2003).

Specifically, a GPS device determines its location by measuring the time it takes for radio signals to
travel to the device from at least four different satellites. Location can then be derived through the processes of
trilateration or multilateration. See AHMED EL-RABBANY, INTRODUCTION TO GPS: THE GLOBAL POSITIONING
SYSTEM 1-2, 8-9 (2002). The location of non-GPS equipped wireless phones can be calculated in a similar fashion,
using the time differences obtained from multiple base stations. It can also be determined using triangulation by
measuring the angles of the signals received by two or more base stations. See Note, Who Knows Where You’ve
Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J. LAW & TECH.
307, 308-09 (2004). Yet another technique, known as “fingerprinting,” permits location to be pinpointed by
analyzing the distortion patterns corresponding to differing locations in a single base station’s receiving range. See
David J. Phillips, Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wireless Communication, 8 COMM. L. &

The GPS network consists of at least two dozen satellites, owned by the United States
government and used initially for exclusively military purposes, that are now freely available for
a variety of civilian navigational uses.189 GPS devices can determine location with a great deal of
precision. Depending on the equipment used, distances covered, and other variables, they can
currently determine location (longitude, latitude, and altitude) to within a few metres.190 The
accuracy of GPS tracking has improved steadily over the years, and further improvement is
expected. Police may either surreptitiously install GPS receivers on suspects’ vehicles or
possessions191 or obtain real-time or historical data generated by commercial GPS devices, such
as those installed in vehicles and wireless phones.192
Wireless telephones are also capable of being conscripted by police for use as tracking
devices, even when they are not equipped with GPS devices. Whenever they are turned on,
wireless (or “cell”) phones automatically and periodically communicate with a network of base
and switching stations.193 These communications, which are carried on a dedicated channel

POL’Y 1, 5 (2003).
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See generally ELLIOT D. KAPLAN, UNDERSTANDING GPS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS (1996). The
government first granted civilians access to GPS in 1983. See April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology: The
Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth
Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 66, 666 (2005).
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One of the leading manufacturers of commercial GPS receivers boasts that its devices are accurate to
within 15 metres, on average. “What is GPS?” Garmin at http://www.garmin.com/aboutGPS/. GPS devices can also
determine an object’s velocity (if it is in motion) and correlate its location with time. See El-Rabbany, supra note
188, at 1, 8-9, 18-19.
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See e.g. Stacy Finz & Michael Taylor, Peterson Tracking Device Called Flawed, Defense Wants
Evidence Shut Out of Trial, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Feb. 12, 2004, at A17. A number of companies sell GPS
devices designed to be surreptitiously installed on vehicles. See e.g. “Covert GPS Vehicle Tracker,” Spook Tech at
http://www.spooktech.com/trackingeqmt/datalogger.shtml; Covert GPS Vehicle Tracking Systems at
http://www.covert-gps-vehicle-tracking-systems.com.
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See El-Rabbany, supra note 188 at 10.

See Note, supra note 188, at 308-09; Matt Richtel, Live Tracking of Mobile Phones Prompts Court
Fights on Privacy, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005 at A1.

separate from the voice and data communications sent or received by the phone’s user, connect
the phone to the network and allow it to switch channels when it moves from one cell area to
another.194 The accuracy of non-GPS wireless phone tracking varies widely, depending on a
number of factors, including the sophistication of the technology and the number of stations
within range of the phone. Many contemporary systems can determine location (longitude and
latitude) to within fifty metres,195 and future systems will undoubtedly be even more precise.196
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See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F.
Supp. 2d 747, 750-51 (Magis. Ct., S.D. Texas, 2005) [Application for Pen Register].
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See How 911 Works, BellSouth at http://contact.bellsouth.com/email/bbs/phase2/how911works.html.
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The improvement of non-GPS wireless telephone location technology, as well as the increasing use of
GPS in wireless phones, has been encouraged by legislation mandating compliance with standards for “wireless
911” systems, which automatically determine the location of people making emergency calls from wireless phones.
See Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C. § 615 (2006); FCC 911 Service, 47 C.F.R.
§ 20.18 (2006); Darren Handler, An Island of Chaos Surrounded by a Sea of Confusion: The E911 Wireless Device
Location Initiative, 10 Va. J.L. & TECH. 1 ¶¶ 14-21 (2005); Phillips, supra note 188, at 3-5; Application for Pen
Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 756 (“This inexorable combination of market and regulatory stimuli ensures that cell
phone tracking will become more precise with each passing year.”).
The United States Congress has also required wireless service providers to facilitate law enforcement by
ensuring that their systems can record the location of the antenna tower connected to a telephone at the beginning
and end of each call. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006); Federal Communications Commission, Third Report & Order, In
the Matter of Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 14 FCC Rcd 16794 (1999) [Third Report &
Order]; United States Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission, 227 F.3d 450, 462-64 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). Notably, however, the Federal Communications Commission rejected the argument that providers must
also be able to pinpoint the phone’s location throughout a call’s duration. See Third Report & Order, 14 FCC Rcd at
16816 P 46 (1999).
To date, Canadian regulators have not imposed specific requirements for wireless 911 location tracking,
other than to require new providers to meet the capacities of established ones. See Gordon Gow, Public Safety
Telecommunications in Canada: Regulatory Intervention in the Development of Wireless E9-1-1, 30 CAN. J. COMM.
65 (2004). Consequently, Canada has lagged behind the United States in the development of wireless 911 systems.
While municipal governments and wireless and wireline service providers have voluntarily cooperated to develop
systems, few providers are currently able to transmit precise location information to emergency operators. See Colin
J. Bennett & Lori Crowe, Location Based Services and the Surveillance of Mobility: An Analysis of Privacy Risks in
Canada (June 2005) 9-14 at http://web.uvic.ca/polisci/bennett/pdf/LBSFINAL.pdf.
Canadian wireless service providers are required to be capable of recording, for law enforcement purposes,
the most accurate location information available to them. This obligation stems from unpublished licensing
conditions (SOLICITOR GENERAL’S ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS FOR LAWFUL INTERCEPTION OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Rev. Nov. 95)) imposed by Ministerial fiat pursuant to s. 5 of the Radiocommunication
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-2. See generally INDUSTRY CANADA, SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POLICY: SPECTRUM LICENSING POLICY FOR CELLULAR AND INCUMBENT PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
(PCS) (December 2003) at 10-1, at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/insmt-

As with GPS tracking, police may obtain wireless telephone location data in real time197 or from
historical records maintained by service providers.198 They may also use commercial wireless
networks to track devices surreptitiously placed on vehicles or other objects.199
The question, then, is whether courts should find that these “second generation” radio
tracking systems invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. As in the case of infrared searches,
the conventional, morally grounded approach is not particularly helpful. Consider first the public
exposure doctrine. By definition, people who venture into public spaces (such as streets and
highways) voluntarily subject their movements and behaviours to observation. It could easily be
argued that it is unreasonable to expect one’s public activities to remain private. Indeed, at least
one court has seized on this syllogism in concluding that cell phone tracking does not trigger
Fourth Amendment protection.200

gst.nsf/vwapj/pcspolicy_dec16_e_final.pdf/$FILE/pcspolicy_dec16_e_final.pdf; Richard-Philippe Martel, Privacy
on the Air (paper presented to the “Wireless Millennium” Spectrum 20/20 Conference, Ottawa, 3 December 1998),
at
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/speech/archive/02_05_a_981203_e.asp?V=Print#Wireless%20Mobile%20Communicatio
n%20Technologies%20Reveal%20Where%20We%20Go.
Improvements in wireless telephone tracking are also being spurred by commercial marketing strategies,
including the placement on people’s phones of advertising and other content tied to their consumer profile and realtime location. See Phillips, supra note 188, at 12; Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Call
Location Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 381, 381-82 (2003); Stephen E. Henderson,
Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and its State Analogs to Protect Third-Party
Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 382-84 (2006). In the United States, however,
wireless carriers may not provide personally identifiable location information to commercial third parties in the
absence of customers’ explicit consent. See Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C. §
222(f) (2006).
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Investigators seeking prospective wireless telephone location data usually obtain it from service
providers; but they may also have the ability to gather it directly. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Electronic Surveillance
Manual, at 44-45 (rev. June 2005), cited in Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 755.
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See Robert Stabe, Electronic Surveillance – Non-Wiretap, § 3.31, in U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal
Narcotics Prosecutions, cited in Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 755.
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United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 950-52 (6th Cir. 2004).

As many commentators have pointed out, however, the public exposure doctrine fails to
account for the fact that electronic tracking threatens the sense of anonymity that people often
enjoy in public spaces.201 While we necessarily take the risk that our public behaviour will be
observed by others, these observations are typically sporadic and fleeting. As I discuss in more
detail below, GPS and wireless telephone tracking systems allow authorities to surreptitiously
monitor and record people’s movements in a systematic and detailed manner over an indefinite
period of time. This kind of intensive surveillance is not analogous to the passing observations of
strangers. Applying the public exposure doctrine to modern tracking technologies may thus fail
to confer a normatively attractive degree of privacy.
The intimacy doctrine is similarly unhelpful. People’s public movements typically reveal
only mundane information about them. Of course, this is not always true. Many people would
not want it known that they had visited a psychiatric institution, gay bar, adult video store, an
extramarital lover’s home, or a political or religious meeting. Arguably, using location tracking
technologies to obtain this kind of information invades a reasonable expectation of privacy
because it relates to “biographical core of personal information” revealing “intimate details” of
“lifestyle or private decisions.”202
The problem with this argument, however, is that while intimate personal information
may be obtained by sophisticated tracking technologies, it may also be obtained by
unsophisticated, conventional surveillance. No reasonable expectation of privacy is triggered
201

See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth
Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1349, 1371-74 (2004); Otterberg, supra note
189, at 685-86; Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17
LAW & PHI. 559, 575-76 (1998); Pomerance, supra note 186, at 291.

when police discover extremely sensitive personal information by simply observing a suspect in
public spaces. Yet it is reasonable to argue, as I elaborate in detail below, that electronic tracking
should not be permitted without a warrant. Measuring the intimacy of the information that
tracking technologies reveal, in other words, is of little assistance in deciding whether they
invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.203
As in the case of infrared searches, cost-benefit analysis is more helpful.
Privacy costs – Consider first the social costs associated with recognizing a reasonable
expectation of privacy in relation to tracking devices. Doing so would cause policing to become
more expensive, less effective, or both. Contemporary technologies permit police to monitor
suspects’ movements with a great deal of precision,204 over a vast spatial expanse,205 and for very
long periods of time.206 The financial costs to police of using these technologies, moreover, are
relatively modest.207
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As its name suggests, the geographic reach of GPS tracking is global. In Canada and the United States
(as well as much of the rest of the world), wireless telephone networks are increasingly extensive. Only the very
least densely populated parts of North America are exempt from coverage.
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In the case of a surreptitiously planted GPS device, continuous surveillance is possible for the length of
its battery’s life. One company boasts that the batteries in its device may last up to thirty days. See
http://www.brickhousesecurity.com/slimtrak-realtime-gps-tracking-car-locator.html. If switched on, the GPS
transceivers installed by vehicle manufacturers can function for an indefinite period, though service providers do not
generally monitor the vehicle unless the subscriber initiates a service request, the vehicle is involved in an accident,
or the provider is compelled by a court order. See e.g. OnStar, OnStar Privacy Statement at
http://www.onstar.com/us_english/jsp/privacy_policy.jsp. Wireless phone monitoring is possible whenever the
device is turned on.
207

The costs associated with electronic tracking depend on a variety of factors, including the sophistication
of the technology and whether police use their own systems or co-opt those of commercial service providers. As
discussed in the text below, it most circumstances these costs are very likely to be significantly lower than those
associated with analogous forms of surveillance.

The most obvious substitute for prospective208 electronic tracking is visual surveillance.
If police are interested only in obtaining location information, electronic tracking is far superior
to visual surveillance. Compared to visual surveillance, it requires less manpower, is more
reliable (there is typically less danger of “losing” the target), and carries a lower risk of
detection. These advantages multiply when police track the movements of several people at
once. Without electronic tracking, this would typically require a substantial deployment of
manpower. With it, it could require only a single officer manning a video monitor.
If police want to do more than simply track a suspect’s location (for instance, if they also
want to interdict a drug transaction), or if the location information generated by electronic
tracking is insufficiently precise, they may still need to deploy officers on the ground to conduct
visual surveillance. In such cases, however, electronic tracking may still be helpful.
Supplementing visual surveillance with electronic tracking allows police to use fewer officers
and follow suspects from greater distances and more discreet vantage points.
The social costs of recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in retrospective209
electronic tracking are even greater than for prospective tracking, as there is no ready “low tech”
substitute for retrospectively tracking a suspect’s movements. Retrospective location information
is most commonly obtained from wireless telephone service providers. A suspect’s whereabouts
at a given time in the past can sometimes be determined by other means, such as questioning the
208

By “prospective” tracking I mean situations where police target suspects for surveillance and then
capture location information from that time forward. Police may either track suspects in real-time or analyze
location data at any time after it has been recorded.
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By “retrospective” tracking I mean situations where police obtain location information for a period
during which they had not tracked a suspect’s location. Retrospective location information thus always derives from
either records kept by third parties or less commonly, suspects themselves (as in the case of information inputted by
suspects into their own GPS devices).

suspect or other people or obtaining credit card, banking, or other transactional records.
Questioning may tip off the suspect, however, and result in the loss or destruction of evidence.
More importantly, none of these methods provides the kind of continuous, historical record of
the suspect’s movements available from wireless providers.210 If retrospective location tracking
were held to invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, police lacking grounds to obtain a
warrant would have to resort to much more costly, risky, and intrusive methods, such as
undercover questioning.211
Privacy benefits – Would the widespread use of location tracking technologies create
substantial avoidance or defensive costs? While it is difficult to be definitive, the answer is most
likely “yes.” As mentioned, people who venture out into public spaces subject themselves to
observation by others, including police. People take this into account, of course, often behaving
differently in public than they would in private.212
The chilling effects of this kind of observation are limited, however. While subject to
observation, in most public spaces we enjoy anonymity. Others may see us doing something
stigmatizing, but if they do not know who we are, this information is unlikely to be used against
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Wireless providers currently keep records (for varying lengths of time) of subscribers’ locations that are
accurate to within approximately 300 yards. See Richtel, supra note 193. European Union member states recently
agreed to enact legislation requiring telecommunications service providers to retain records of telephone and internet
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The effectiveness of GPS and wireless telephone tracking, it should be noted, may be blunted by
defensive measures. Criminals may switch off GPS chips in their cell phones, inspect possessions for planted
tracking devices, use anonymous wireless phone services, or conduct business in places beyond the range of
tracking systems. These measures impose costs, however, and may thereby diminish the rate of criminal activity.
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See Stigler, supra note 14, at 627.

us. This anonymity frees people, as Melvin Gutterman has put it, to “merge into the ‘situational
landscape.’”213 Contemporary electronic tracking technologies threaten this freedom. Police
could monitor an area for active transceivers (such as those embedded in wireless telephones or
GPS-equipped vehicles), and if a person’s location or movements attracted their attention for
some reason, his or her identity could be determined by cross-referencing the transceiver’s
identification number with subscriber databases.
As discussed, public scrutiny is also typically brief and episodic. Our public behaviour
may be observed, but any one observer will generally only obtain a small fragment of
information about us. And if our activities are subject to prolonged, unwanted observation, we
can usually take steps to preserve our privacy. Surreptitious visual observation is difficult, and in
most cases people can confront or elude their observer. With GPS and wireless telephone
tracking, in contrast, people generally do not know whether they are being monitored. These
systems are also able to continuously track people’s movements over both an extensive
geographic space and lengthy period of time. This kind of surveillance may reveal patterns,
associations, and activities that would not be apparent to casual observers.214
Further, even when we observe non-anonymous, stigmatizing public behaviour (for
example, seeing a neighbour entering an adult video store), the person observed may be able to
credibly deny the transgression to others.215 Location tracking technologies, however, can
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See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 262 (Wash. S.C. 2003); Otterberg, supra note 189, at 696-98. See
also Blitz, supra note 201, at 1409-10; Nissenbaum, supra note 201, at 576-77.
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See Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 536 A.2d 354, 365 (1987), cited in Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 51 (“if
people in society come to believe [that participant surveillance] is widespread and done without probable cause, they
may begin to fall silent on many occasions when previously they would have felt free to speak, confident in the

generate reliable, permanent records, dramatically diminishing people’s ability to successfully
challenge harmful accusations.
Lastly, for most non-criminals, the risk of being subjected to prolonged visual
surveillance by police is highly remote. Police resources are limited, and they are thus unlikely to
monitor people who are not strongly suspected of criminal activity.216 But as I have discussed,
contemporary tracking systems can inexpensively and continuously monitor many subjects over
an extensive geographic space. This could enable the efficient monitoring of people who are only
very weakly suspected of criminal activity. Police could use GPS or wireless telephone systems,
for example, to track the movements of anyone carrying a transceiver in a “high crime” area or
the proximity of a suspected criminal or terrorist.
The non-anonymous, continuous, surreptitious, geographically and temporally extensive,
reliable, and inexpensive character of GPS and wireless telephone tracking has the potential,
therefore, to induce a much greater chill on productive behaviour than visual observation. If there
is a realistic possibility that police may monitor and record visitations to psychiatric clinics,
AIDS testing centres, needle exchanges, women’s shelters, mosques, and the like, then some
people who would otherwise have engaged in valuable activities in these places will not do so.217
The avoidance costs associated with location tracking are potentially quite substantial.
If the possibility of being monitored by does not cause a person to avoid valuable

belief that they could challenge the credibility or memory of the trusted colleague who would betray them.”).
216
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See Otterberg, supra note 189, at 695.

GPS and wireless telephone tracking systems are being integrated with sophisticated mapping systems
that correlate location with virtually any other kind of information relevant to police or emergency services
personnel, such as crime statistics, business and housing types, and vehicle traffic data. See Phillips, supra note 188,
at 5.

activities, that person may nevertheless expend resources to prevent surveillance. Like criminals,
non-criminals may attempt to thwart electronic location tracking, especially when they are
engaged in sensitive activities. People may, for example, turn off their wireless phones or GPS
devices. In doing so, however, they would forgo the many benefits conferred by these
technologies. This must count as a significant cost of failing to regulate electronic tracking.
We must next ask whether the judicial regulation of tracking technologies is likely to
prevent inefficient law enforcement expenditures. Unlike infrared cameras, which are used to
detect only one form of criminal activity (indoor marijuana cultivation) electronic tracking is
used in many different types of investigations. Most of these involve crimes that everyone agrees
should be prohibited. Like wiretapping, however, electronic tracking captures a great deal of
information about innocent activity. This creates a risk that police will use tracking technologies
to monitor non-criminal behaviour. Before the widespread adoption of statutory and
constitutional protections against warrantless wiretapping, it was not uncommon for authorities
to use it to monitor and intimidate members of unorthodox political groups.218 And there is
evidence that public video surveillance systems are frequently used to observe and harass
minorities, women, and the poor.219 Of course, regulating surveillance technologies cannot
guarantee that they will not be misused; but it does make it difficult to establish the kind of
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See e.g. Developments in the Law – The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties: IV. Covert
Government Surveillance, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1972); David Berry, The First Amendment and Law
Enforcement Infiltration of Political Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 207 (1982); Athan G. Theoharis, FBI Surveillance:
Past and Present, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 883 (1984); COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF
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extensive surveillance networks that facilitate widespread abuse.
There are other tools available to minimize abuses of surveillance technologies,220
especially when it is clear that police have targeted subjects for personal or political ends.
Abuses are much more difficult to detect, however, when minorities are targeted in legitimate
criminal investigations. As discussed, discriminatory profiling is most common in face-to-face
confrontations between police and minorities, as in street and vehicle stops. These encounters
often cause innocent suspects to feel embarrassed, stigmatized, and unfairly treated.
As in the case of infrared searches, police engaged in electronic tracking may not be
aware of the race or ethnicity of the people being monitored. The unique identifier of the
monitored transceivers, however, can be linked to users’ identities, which can in turn be linked to
databases containing information on race, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. Police can also
supplement electronic tracking with visual surveillance, for example when they judge an
individual’s movements to be suspicious. In such cases they may disproportionately select
minorities for further investigation or surveillance. So while electronic tracking is less likely to
cause discriminatory profiling than street or vehicle stops, it is more likely to do so than infrared
searches.
To summarize, failing to regulate GPS and wireless telephone tracking is likely to impose
substantial costs on society. Although it is difficult to assess their magnitude, a strong argument
can be made that they probably outweigh the benefits of non-regulation. In any case, it is clear
that unregulated electronic tracking is much more costly than unregulated infrared searching.
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 67 (1998).
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See e.g. Criminal Code, § 195; 18 U.S.C. § 3126 (2006).

Infrared searches reveal very little about what is happening inside people’s homes. They simply
indicate that an area, room, or building is substantially hotter than its surroundings. Combined
with other information, this may provide a simple and reliable indicator that a structure is being
used for a specific, criminal purpose. GPS and wireless telephone tracking systems, in contrast,
reveal a great deal of information about non-criminal behaviour. The disclosure of this
information to the state that has the potential to lead to substantial avoidance and defensive
costs221 as well as abusive and discriminatory policing.
Decision-making error – The forgoing analysis has demonstrated that the benefits and
costs associated with the unrestrained governmental use of location tracking technologies are
both substantial. Which legal institution – legislatures or courts – is best placed to decide which
side of the ledger should prevail? As in the case of infrared imaging, tracking technologies are
changing quickly. As discussed, contemporary GPS and wireless tracking systems are much
more powerful and precise than the primitive beepers considered in Knotts, Karo, and Wise. And
while it is clear that tracking devices will continue to become more accurate and prevalent, their
future development cannot be predicted with anything approaching certainty. We do not know,
for example, how precise or unobtrusive they may eventually become.222 Nor can we predict all
of the ways in which they will be used by individuals and commercial service providers.223
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Legislatures are better equipped to respond to this kind of technological flux than courts. As
discussed, they have better access to technical information and are better placed to weigh voters’
preferences on privacy and security concerns.
It is distinctly possible, however, that giving legislatures exclusive authority to regulate
electronic tracking may disproportionately harm the interests of minorities and waste law
enforcement resources. If this is true, and the private and social costs of these harms are not fully
visible to legislators, then there may be a representation reinforcement justification for judicial
intervention. As a result of their familiarity with the criminal investigative process and political
independence, judges may be better attuned to the disparate impacts of tracking technologies on
minorities than legislators.
If legislatures are better placed than courts to weigh the overall benefits and costs of
electronic tracking systems, but courts are more likely to account for disproportionate harms to
minorities, how should judges go about determining the existence and extent of constitutional
protection from this kind of surveillance? There is no easy answer to this question. It is sensible
to begin, however, by examining how legislatures in the United States and Canada have dealt
with location tracking technologies.
To date, Congress has not imposed any substantive limitations on the use of location
tracking devices.224 Police are therefore free to use them without either obtaining a warrant or
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Congress has restricted the use of location tracking in limited circumstances, however. The wireless 911
statute specifies that location information collected during 911 calls can only be disclosed for emergency response
purposes. See the Wireless Communication and Public Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-81, § 5, 113 Stat. 1288
(Oct. 26, 1999) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 222(f) (2006)). Congress has also declared that the envelope data supplied
in response to pen/trap orders for wireless devices must not include location data, except insofar as location can be
determined from telephone numbers. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006).

establishing individualized suspicion.225 Karo established, however, that a reasonable
expectation of privacy is triggered when the installation or monitoring of a tracking device
intrudes on a constitutionally-protected area, such as a private residence. In such cases police
must obtain a warrant.226
A dramatic distinction exists in United States law, then, between tracking in public
spaces, which is unregulated, and tracking in private spaces, which requires a warrant. Yet as we
have seen, the use of GPS and wireless telephone tracking in public spaces creates substantial
social costs. If the decision as to whether to regulate these technologies is left to Congress, there
is a risk that it will fail to act in a fully representative fashion. But if judges intervene and
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The few courts that have considered the question of whether warrantless GPS or wireless telephone
tracking in public spaces violates the Fourth Amendment have all held that it does not. See United States v. Forest,
355 F.3d 942, 951-53 (6th Cir. 2004) (use of cell site data to determine that suspect had travelled from one
municipality to another did not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d
425, 467-68 (N.D. N.Y.) (2005) (use of GPS tracking device on suspect’s vehicle did not invade a reasonable
expectation of privacy); In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435
(Magis. Ct., S.D.N.Y. 2005) at 449-50 [Application for an Order] (issuance of court order for retrospective cell site
data associated with calls did not invade reasonable expectation of privacy as location information voluntarily
disclosed to service provider). However, in Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, at 259-64, the Washington Supreme Court
concluded that the warrantless use of GPS tracking devices violates the state’s constitution. See also United States v.
Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 367-68 (D. Md. 2004) (noting similarities and differences between beepers and GPS
tracking devices, but declining to decide whether monitoring of GPS device constituted search); People v. Lacey,
No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at 4-8 (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. May 6, 2004) (unpublished decision)
(concluding that installation of GPS device constituted search under both federal and state constitutions, but denying
application on basis that defendant lacked standing).
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A provision of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2006)) authorizes
courts to grant warrants for tracking devices that may move across district boundaries. The provision does not speak
to the standard for authorizing such warrants. Most courts have held that they must be issued under the authority of
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes searches for evidence on the basis of
probable cause. See Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747; In re United States for an Order Authorizing
the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (Magis. Ct., E.D.N.Y. 2005), reconsideration denied, 396 F. Supp.
2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of
a Pen Register and a Caller Identification System on Telephone Numbers (Sealed) and Production of Real Time Cell
Site Information, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (Magis. Ct., D. Md. 2005). But see Application for an Order, 405 F. Supp. 2d
435 (holding that government may obtain the location of the connecting antenna tower at the beginning and end of
calls on the basis of the “specific and articulable facts” standard set out in the Stored Communications Act (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006)). In Karo, 468 U.S.at 718 n.5, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly declined to comment
on whether electronic tracking in constitutionally protected areas could be justified by reasonable suspicion.

recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy, there is a risk that they will overestimate the
benefits and underestimate the costs of regulation.
One way to mitigate both of these risks is for courts to recognize an expectation of
privacy, but require only that police justify tracking on the basis of reasonable suspicion.227 This
would significantly diminish the potential for discriminatory profiling while maintaining law
enforcement’s ability to track when they have only a moderate degree of suspicion. If Congress
determined that the social costs of GPS and wireless telephone tracking justified the use of the
probable cause standard, it would be free to legislate accordingly. Such a decision would be the
product of a richer information environment than is generally available to courts.
This is essentially the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in Wise. That
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This standard is typically expressed in United States legislation and jurisprudence as “specific and
articulable facts.” See e.g. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (authorizing “stop and frisk” searches); Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)-(d) (2006) (authorizing government access to non-content subscriber
records held by service provider). In Canada, the same standard is expressed variously as “articulable cause” (see
e.g. R. v. Simpson, 12 O.R. (3d) 182 at 199, 200-04 (Ont. C.A.1993)), “reasonable grounds to suspect” or
“reasonable grounds to detain” (see e.g. R. v. Mann [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (Can.) ¶¶ 30, 33, 45), or “reasonable
suspicion” (see e.g. Criminal Code, §§ 492.1, 492.2).
Courts could require governments to meet an even lower standard to justify GPS and wireless telephone
tracking. The standard of mere “relevance” to a criminal investigation is used, for example, for a number of statutory
search powers in the United States. See e.g. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3407, and 3408 (2006) (authorizing orders for
financial records); 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2006) (authorizing orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices). Recall,
however, that these provisions were enacted after the Supreme Court ruled that these searches did not invade a
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. As long as the application meets the formal
requirements set out in the statute, courts must grant the authorization; they have no authority to undertake an
independent evaluation of the relevance of the information sought. See In re United States, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1559
(M.D. Fla. 1994); United States. v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995). Recall as well that while violations
of these statutes may result in criminal sanctions, exclusion of evidence is not a remedy. See supra notes 136 and
140.
Even this very limited form of regulation would provide significant protection against discriminatory
profiling. Requiring police to go to court to obtain an authorization imposes a substantial logistical and economic
restraints on their ability to arbitrarily select suspects for investigation. It also makes it virtually impossible to
engage in the kind of mass surveillance of public spaces that GPS and wireless telephone tracking technologies
make possible. There would likely be little difference in practice, then, between the standards of reasonable
suspicion and relevance. Police are unlikely to invest the time and resources required to obtain a court authorization
unless they have at least a reasonable suspicion that tracking will reveal evidence of criminal activity.

decision considered first generation tracking technology, however. The question that Canadian
courts now face is whether the legislative response to Wise, which authorizes tracking warrants
on reasonable suspicion, complies with section 8 of the Charter when applied to GPS and
wireless telephone tracking.228 As the argument presented above suggests, the answer to this
question should be “yes.” While GPS and wireless telephone tracking systems impose greater
costs on society than the beepers considered in Wise, they also have greater benefits. Requiring
warrants, even on the modest standard of reasonable suspicion, severely limits the risk of
widespread stereotyping and discrimination. With this protection in place, the task of estimating
the costs and benefits of tracking technologies and choosing an appropriate scheme to regulate
them is best left to Parliament.

228

Criminal Code, § 492.1. Another live question is whether this provision authorizes the monitoring of
tracking devices that were not installed by government agents. The provision permits agents “to install, maintain,
and remove a tracking device in or on any thing, including a thing carried, used or worn by any person . . . and to
monitor, or to have monitored, a tracking device installed in or on any thing.” “Tracking device” is defined as “any
device that, when installed in or on any thing, may be used to help ascertain, by electronic or other means, the
location of any thing or person.” While the first clause refers to the installation of the device by police, the
subsequent clauses use the verb “install” in the passive voice, implying that it may be effected by non-state agents.
From a policy perspective, there would seem little reason to differentiate between devices installed by police and
those used by commercial service providers. To date, there have been no reported decisions on either the
interpretation or constitutionality of s. 492.1 in the context of GPS or wireless telephone tracking. See generally R.
v. T. & T. Fisheries, 2005 CarswellPEI 71 (Prov. Ct.) (WeC) (s. 492.1 warrant used by police to install and monitor
GPS tracking device); R. v. Gerrard, 2003 CarswellOnt 421 (S.C.J.) (WeC) (police used general investigative
warrant provision in s. 487.01 of the Code (which requires reasonable and probable grounds) to install and monitor a
GPS tracking device).

CONCLUSION
The reasonable expectation of privacy test does not require a radical overhaul. Courts
have cast it as a rough cost-benefit calculus and have generally crafted reasonable compromises
between privacy and crime control interests. The test can undoubtedly be improved, however,
and economic analysis can play an important role in this, especially as emerging technologies
threaten the vitality of traditional conceptions of privacy based on secrecy and intimacy.
The chief contribution of economics in this area is to provide a more rigorous and
productive alternative to the moral conception of privacy that courts have conventionally relied
on in making reasonable expectation of privacy decisions. Unlike the moral approach, the
economic approach does not justify protecting privacy for its own sake, but rather because it
often enhances social welfare by diminishing avoidance, defensive, and suboptimal enforcement
costs. Economic analysis also suggests, however, that courts should refuse to recognize a
reasonable expectation of privacy when doing so would generate few of these costs, but would
significantly enhance deterrence. Economics and public choice theory can also reduce decisionmaking error by identifying the circumstances in which courts should be especially deferential to
legislative choice, i.e. where a search technology is novel, technically complex, and undergoing
rapid change and its costs are borne by a broad swath of the population.
By these standards, infrared searches do not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.
They provide police with a powerful investigative tool, thereby enhancing the deterrence of
crime, without producing (to any significant extent) the costs associated with the avoidance of
productive activity, the prevention of privacy intrusions, the enforcement of inefficient criminal

prohibitions, or the profiling of vulnerable minorities. The economic approach confirms that the
Supreme Court of Canada in Tessling (and not the majority of the United States Supreme Court
in Kyllo) correctly concluded that warrantless infrared searches are constitutional. It also
suggests that courts should defer to legislatures in deciding whether and how to regulate future,
potentially more intrusive infrared technologies, so long as these technologies do not
disproportionately harm minorities.
The case for recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to GPS and
wireless telephone tracking is much stronger. The privacy costs associated with these
technologies are substantially greater than for infrared searches. Location tracking has the
potential to produce substantial avoidance and defensive costs. It may also increase the risk of
discriminatory profiling. The case for legislative deference is also weaker for GPS and wireless
telephone tracking than for infrared searches. The complexity and rapid development of tracking
technologies militate in favour of legislative regulation; but legislatures are unlikely to fully
account for disproportionate impacts on minority suspects. The best solution may thus be for
courts to recognize a minimal expectation of privacy that would require warrants based on
reasonable suspicion. This would provide considerable protection against discriminatory
profiling without usurping the legislature’s capacity to determine the need for more extensive
regulation.

